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Imagine riding the train to. Ho Chi Minh city on your way to
negotiate the final details of a complex licensing agreement. Before
you arrive, you prepare for the meeting by accessing a database back
in your Manhattan office with your notebook computer. Or imagine
calling your San Francisco office from a kiosk outside the Kremlin
with your cellular telephone. Out of the innovative developments in
radiocommunication technology, a race has emerged to provide global
data and voice services utilizing networks of low orbiting satellites.'
Low-earth-orbit (LEO) satellite systems2 will provide "cellular-like
mobile services to users anywhere, position location services, search
and rescue communications, disaster management communications,
environmental monitoring, paging services, facsimile transmission
services, cargo tracking, and industrial monitoring and control.'"3 Po-
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1. See e.g., In the Matter of Amendment of Section 2.106 of the Commission's Rules to
Allocate the 1610-1625.5 MHz and the 2483.5-2500 MHz Bands for Use by Mobile-Satellite
Service, Including Non-geostationary Satellites, Notice of Proposed Rule Making and Tentative
Decision, ET Docket No. 92-98,7 F.C.C.R. 6414 (released Sept. 4, 1992; adopted Aug. 5, 1992)
[hereinafter Large LEO Satellite TD].
2. The FCC defines "low-earth-orbiting satellite systems" as "any system that is not oper-
ating in geostationary orbit. This includes systems operating in lower-altitude orbits, medium-
altitude orbits, and highly elliptical orbits." In the Matter of Amendment of the Commission's
Rule to Establish and Policies to Mobile Satellite Service in the 1610-1626.5/2483.5-2500 MHz
Frequency Bands, Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, CC Docket No. 92-166, 1994 FCC LEXIS
744 n.6 (released Feb. 18, 1994; adopted Jan. 19, 1994) available in LEXIS, FEDCOM library,
FCC file [hereinafter Large LEO Satellite NPRM].
Generally, LEO satellites orbit the earth at distances of 1000 to 2000 kilometers. See e.g.,
In the Matter of Amendment of Section 2.106 of the Commissions Rules to Allocate Spectrum to
the Fixed-Sitellite Service and the Mobile-Satellite Service for Low-Earth-Orbit Satellites, No-
tice of Proposed Rule Making and Tentative Decision, Er Docket No. 91-280, 6 F.C.C.R. 5932,
3 (released Oct. 18, 1991; adopted Sept. 26, 1991) [hereinafter Small LEO Satellite NPRM]; In
the Matter of Amendment of Section 2.106 of the Commissions Rules to Allocate Spectrum to
the FLxed-Satellite Service and the Mobile-Satellite Service for Low-Earth-Orbit Satellites, Re-
port and Order, 8 F.C.C.R. 1812, 1 2 (released Feb. 5, 1993; adopted Jan. 14, 1993) available in
LEXIS, FEDCOM library, FCC file [hereinafter Small LEO Satellite R&O].
3. Large LEO Satellite NPRM, supra note 2, 2.
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tentially a multi-billion dollar industry, these new services are ex-
pected to stimulate economic growth, create employment
opportunities in the United States and abroad, and provide global tele-
communications to underdeveloped areas of the world "that have pre-
viously been grossly underserved." 4
This comment examines the licensing process evolving out of the
dynamic interaction between the Federal Communications Commis-
sion (FCC) and the private companies planning to commercialize LEO
satellite techn0logy. The sec0nd section briefly outlines the major in-
ternational and domestic regulatory programs that allocate and assign
the radio frequency spectrum for LEO satellite systems. The third
section analyzes and compares the methods currently used by the FCC
to assign the frequency spectrum and to distribute licenses to LEO
satellite applicants: comparative hearings, negotiated rulemaking, lot-
teries, pioneer's preferences, and competitive bidding.
II. REGULATION AND LIcENSING OF LEO SATELLITES
A. Background
For more than twenty years, commercial satellite technology has
thrived under the FCC's permissive regulatory supervision.5 Com-
mercial enterprises have focused their efforts primarily on the devel-
opment of global telecommunication networks utilizing geostationary
satellites.6 These satellites require two resources: the radio frequency
spectrum 7 and the geostationary orbit.'
4. Id. f 2-3.
5. See Pamela L. Meredith & Franceska 0. Schroeder, Privately-Owned Commercial
Telecommunications Satellites: Licensing and Regulation by the Federal Communications Com-
mission, 27 CAL. W. L. REV. 107-108 (1990). In contrast, satellite activities in other countries
with satellite capabilities are government-owned monopolies. Id. at 108.
6. MILTON L. SMrrH, INTERNATIoNAL REGULATION OF SATaUT COMMUNICA7rON I
(1990); see also Paula K. Speck, Comment, Competition in International Satellite Telecommuni-
cations. Alternative Avenues, 20 TEx. InT'L L. J. 517, 520-21 (1985).
7. The radio frequency spectrum is defined as that part of the electromagnetic spectrum
between zero and 3,000 Gigabertz. Geneva Radio Regulations, Dec. 6, 1979, S. TREArY Doc.
21, 97th Cong., 2d Sess., art. 1 (1980) [hereinafter Radio Regulations]. Hertz is the unit of
frequency. One hertz is one cycle per second of any electromagnetic wave. Every telecommuni-
cation signal operates within a range of radio frequencies measured in hertz, which is called its
bandwidth. JoHN R. PIERcE, SIGNALS: THE TELEPHONE AND BEYOND 28-34 (1981).
8. SMrrH, supra note 6, at 5. A satellite is called geostationary when its period of revolu-
tion is approximately equal' to that of the earth. By placing the satellite in orbit above the equator
at an altitude of approximately 36,000 kilometers, known as the GSO, the satellite appears statio-'
nary relative to a point on the earth. The beam from a satellite in the GSO can cover almost one
third of the earth, therefore'a system of three geostationary satellites can provide a global tele-
communications network. Id. at 5-6.
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Proponents of LEO satellite systems claim that these systems will
have technical and economic advantages over systems using geosta-
tionary satellites.9 Although the commercial success of these LEO
satellite systems remains speculative at this point,10 the technical fea-
sibility of low orbiting satellites has already been demonstrated by
several government-owned LEO satellites, used for military and scien-
tific purposes." LEO satellites are lighter, less expensive to launch
and require less operating power than geostationary satellites. 2 In ad-
dition, LEO satellites can receive communications from smaller and
weaker earth transmitters since the satellites are closer to the earth.'3
Although LEO satellites are in constant motion relative to a fixed
point on the earth, continuous service can be provided by overlapping
satellite orbits; as one satellite passes out of range, another appears
over the horizon. 4 The main disadvantage of using LEO satellites in
a telecommunications network seems to be that their operating life-
times are about half those of geostationary satellites, due to the
stronger effects of gravity on low orbiting satellites.'"
The FCC recognizes two types of LEO satellites: "small LEO
satellites," which operate below 1 gigahertz (GHz),' 6 and "large LEO
satellites," which require portions of the radio frequency above 1
GHz.'7 Three companies have developed plans for small LEO satel-
9. Edmund L. Andrews, Wireless Phones: Different Visions, N.Y; TIMAS, Aug. 26, 1992,
at D5.
10. Proponents of LEO satellite systems have experienced difficulties in raising financing
because some potential investors are said to have been deterred by the profusion of regulatory
and political delays. LEO Faces Plethora of Fitiancial Obstacles, 12 Comm. DAILy, Nov. 10,
1992, at 5.
11. See Small LEO Satellite NPRM, supra note.2, 1 2. Much of the new LEO satellite
technology was developed out of research originally funded for U.S. defense systems. See EC
Officials Concerned With Pace of U.S. LEO Satellite Industry, 12 CoM. DAMY, Sept. 28, 1992,
at 4 [hereinafter Officials Concerned]. The scope of this comment will be limited to the recently
proposed privately-owned LEO satellite systems.
12. Andrews, supra note 9. To launch a LEO satellite costs approximately one-twentieth
of what it costs to launch an average geostationary satellite. Small LEO satellite NPRM, supra
note 2, 9.
13. Andrews, supra note 9.
14. Id.
15. Small LEO satellite NPRM, supra note 2, at [ 9.
16. Id. n.l. Small LEO satellites will use about 4 MHz of bandwidth, operating in the
range of spectrum known as VHF/UHF (very high frequency and ultra high frequency). Id.
Recently, the FCC has begun to refer to small LEOS as Non-Voice, Non-Geostationary
(NVNG) Mobile-Satellites. See In the Matter of Amendment of the Commission's Rules to
Establish Rules and Policies Pertaining to a Non-Voice, Non-Geostationary Mobile-Satellite Ser-
vice, Report and Order, CC Docket No. 92-76, 1993 FCC LEXIS 5734, available in LEXIS,
FEDCOM library, FCC file (released Nov. 16, 1993; adopted Oct. 21, 1993) [hereinafter NVNG
R&O].
17. Small LEO Satellite NPRM, supra note 2, n.l. Large LEO satellites will use more
than 16 MHz in the frequency range above I GHz.
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lite systems operating from 2 to 24 satellites to provide data messag-
ing and position determination services, such as locating lost hikers
and tracking the location of cars, trucks and ships.18 Five companies
have envisioned rival networks consisting of 12 to 66 large LEO satel-
lites to link up mobile telephones and laptop computers.19 These large
LEO satellite networks will enable customers to make and receive
calls from anywhere, even where current conventional cellular tele-
phone service is unavailable.20
These innovative proposals have presented the FCC with difficult
and complex regulatory issues. Although the radio frequency bands to
be used by LEO satellites have already been allocated internationally
by the International Telecommunications Union and domestically by
the FCC,22 each system must also receive a specific frequency assign-
ment from the FCC.' Assigning specific frequencies is a complex
matter because the radio frequency spectrum is already congested, and
the users of the spectrum have competing interests.' The major hur-
dle in frequency assignment by the FCC is that the proponents of LEO
satellite systems have developed competing and potentially incompati-
ble technologies to transmit communication signals.' Because the
number of FCC license applicants has apparently exceeded the
number of existing frequency allocations, these technical conflicts
among competing systems may force some companies to alter or
abandon their current designs for LEO satellite systems.26 Finally, in
addition to receiving frequency assignments, each proponent must pe-
18. Id. 2-6. For a general description of these small LEO satellite system proposals,
see infra appendix A.
19. In the Matter of Amendment of Section 2.106 of the Commission's Rules to Allocate
the 1610-1626.5 MHz and the 2483.5-2500 MHz Bands for Use by the Mobile-Satellite Service,
Including Non-geostationary Satellites, Report and Order, ET Docket No. 92-98, 1994 FCC
LEXIS 150, 1 4 (released Jan. 12, 1994; adopted Dec. 13, 1993) available in LEXIS, FEDCOM
library, FCC file [hereinafter Large LEO Satellite R&O]. For a general discussion of these large
LEO satellite proposals, see infra appendix A.
20. Large LEO Satellite TD, supra note 1, 5.
21. See infra part H. The international allocation of radio frequencies to communication
services is decided by the International Telecommunications Union, a special agency of the
United Nations. DAvID M. Lmv, INTmAIONAL Tm.EcotmuNicAioNs AND INTERNATIONAL
LAw: TrE REGULAMON 6F r RADIO SPEcmm 1, 19-20 (1970).
22. See infra part U. The FCC is responsible for the assignment and national allocation of
frequency bands to specific stations. 47 U.S.C. §§ 303(c) and 153(k) (1988).
23. 47 U.S.C. §§ 303(c) and 153(k) (1988).
24. LiEMV, supra note 21, 18-19.
25. See infra appendix B for a brief overview of these competing modulation-access
techniques.
26. Karen Lynch, U.S. Seeks Foothold in the Sky, Comm. WK., June 1, 1992, at IA.
[Vol. 10
LOW-EARTH-ORBIT SATELLTES
tition the FCC for a license to construct, launch and operate a pro-
posed satellite.27
B. Regulation of the Radio Frequency Spectrum
The proposed LEO satellite systems are subject to the interna-
tional and domestic regulations covering the use of the radio fre-
quency spectrum, which has been declared a "limited natural
resource."28 In contrast to other natural resources such as minerals,
water, and fossil fuels, the frequency spectrum is used rather than con-
sumed.29 As the global use of the radio frequency spectrum has ex-
panded, international and national regulatory institutions have become
necessary to ensure that the spectrum is equitably apportioned and to
avoid harmful interference among competing users.3°
1. International Allocation of the Radio Frequency
Spectrum
Allocation of the radio frequency spectrum is a function of the
International Telecommunications Union (ITU), which is a specialized
agency of the United Nations.3 1 The ITU Convention32 created the
ITU as an entity, defined its organization, and enunciated its purposes
and membership rules.33 Over 165 countries are members of the ITU,
demonstrating universal recognition of the need for international co-
operation in the use of the radio frequency spectrum. 34 To avoid
"harmful interference" 35 among the radio stations of different coun-
tries and to foster international cooperation, the ITU allocates the ra-
dio frequency spectrum and requires the registration of frequency
27. See infra part II.C. After LEO satellite" systems receive spectrum assignments and
licenses from the FCC, each proponent must still negotiate licensing agreements with foreign
countries. ITU's Taranne Tells Satel Conseil Fiber Will Be Networks' Medium of Choice, 12
COMM. DAILY, Sept. 30, 1992, at 3. The scope of this comment is limited to domestic licensing
issues.
28. International Telecommunication Convention, Nov. 6, 1982, S. TREAT- DoC. No. 6,
99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985) [hereinafter Convention].
29. LmvF, supra note 21, at 15-16.
30. Id.
31. Id, at 19.
32. Convention, supra note 28.
33. Id
34. SMrrH, supra note 6, at 36-37 n.2. For an historical analysis of the function and organi-
zation of the ITU, see LmVE, supra note 21.
35. Defined as "any emission, radiation or induction which endangers the functioning of a
radionavigation service or of other safety services or seriously degrades, obstructs or repeatedly
interrupts a radiocommunication service operating in accordance with the Radio Regulations."
Radio Regulations, supra note 7, art. 48.
1994]
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assignments by each member country.36 These international alloca-
tions are contained in the Radio Regulations,37 which are created or
revised at periodic special meetings of delegates from ITU member
countries.38
The most important of these meetings is the World Administra-
tive Radio Conference (WARC). 39  At WARC-92, the most recent
conference, which concluded on March 3, 1992, the American delega-
tion proposed frequency allocations for small and large LEO satel-
lites.4° After initial opposition from the European delegates,41 the
American delegation was successful and new frequencies were allo-
cated to mobile satellite services, including low orbiting satellites.42
2. National Assignment of the Radio Frequency
Spectrum: The Authority of the FCC
Although the international allocation of radio spectrum frequen-
cies is accomplished by the creation or revision of the Radio Regula-
tions at a WARC, "the Board does not distribute frequencies or
withhold frequencies from ITU members."4 3 The assignment of spe-
cific frequencies to specific services is left to national regulatory enti-
ties.' In the United States, the FCC has maintained an extremely
permissive policy toward private telecommunications satellites.4"
New rules are created and existing rules are amended in response to
36. SMrrH, supra note 6, at 23.
37. Radio Regulations, supra note 7.
38. SMrrH, supra note 6, at 23-25.
39. Speck, supra note 6, at 523. For a detailed discussion of previous conferences, see
LErVF, supra note 21, at 40-81 and SMrih, supra note 6, at 57-183.
40. U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, The 1992 World Administrative Ra.
dio Conference: Issues for U.S. International Spectrum Policy - Background Paper, OTA-BP-
TCr-76, 122-131 (1991) [hereinafter OTA]. The new allocations for small LEO satellites are:
137-138 MHz downlink (space to earth), 148-149.9 MHz uplink (earth to space), and 400.15-
401 MHz downlink bands. Id. at 124. The new allocations for mobile satellites, including LEO
satellites, are 1610-126.5 M]Iz uplink and 2438.5-2500 MHz downlink bands. Id. at 126. The
American proposal was based on petitions originally filed to the FCC in late 1990. Large LEO
Satellite TD, supra note 1, 4.
41. The Europeans opposed the allocation because Europe is already adequately covered
with terrestrial systems that are government-owned. The new services to be provided by LEOs
could undermine these existing terrestrial systems. Tug of WARC, ECONOMmTr, Mar. 7, 1992, at
89.
42. International Telecommunication Union, (WARC-92), Final Acts of the World Ad-
ministrative Radio Conference, Malaga-Torremolinos (1992) cited in Large LEO Satellite
NPRM, supra note 2, n.15.
43. LavF, supra note 21, at 20.'
44. Id.
45. Meredith & Schroeder, supra note 5, at 113.
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proposals submitted by private companies hoping to develop innova-
tive technology.'
The FCC's regulatory authority for the assignment of radio fre-
quencies for commercial satellites stems from the Communications
Act of 193417 and. the Communications Satellite Act of 1962.48 Under
these acts and implementing regulations,49 the FCC is authorized to
allocate and assign specific frequencies that have been allotted inter-
nationally at a WARC.5°
The FCC's rulemaking procedure for assigning frequencies con-
sists of several "notice-and-comment" periods.51 First, private compa-
nies may petition the FCC for an "issuance, amendment or repeal of a
rule or regulation." 52  Once a petition is filed, the FCC will release a
"Public Notice" to inform interested parties of the petition.53 Com-
ments in support of or in opposition to the petition may be filed up to
thirty days after the Public Notice has been issued.54 Replies may be
filed up to 15 days after the comments have been filed.55 "If the
[FCC] determines that the petition discloses sufficient reasons in sup-
port of the action requested,"56 a "Notice of Proposed Rulemaking"
will be issued in the Federal Register to notify potentially interested
parties of the rulemaking 57 and set time limits for comments and reply
comments to be submitted in opposition or support of the proposed
rulemaking.58 After consideration of the comments and replies, the
FCC will issue a final decision in the form of a "Report and Order."59
It often takes several years for a Report and Order to be issued on
a proposed rulemaking. For example, in late 1990, several LEO satel-
46. IL
47. 47 U.S.C. §§ 151-613 (1988).
48. 47 U.S.C. § 701 (1988).
49. 47 C.F.R. pts. 0-19, 21-25 (1993).
50. 47 U.S.C. § 303(c) (1988).
51. There are two types of rulemaking authorized by the Administrative Procedure Act, 5
U.S.C. § 533 (1988): informal and formal. Phillips Petroleum v. FPC, 475 F.2d 842, 851 (10th
Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1146 (1974). "Informal rulemaking-commonly called no-
tice-and-comment-rulemaking is the normal type." BEmRAR6 ScHwARrz, ADMIUNsRATIVE
LAw 199 (3d ed. 1991). Formal rulemaling is an exception requiring that agency rules be "pre-
ceded by a 'trial-type' hearing." Id The FCC's comparative hearing process is an example of
formal rulemaking. See discussion infra part III.A.
52. 47 C.F.R. § 1.401(a) (1993).
53. L § 1.403.
54. l § 1.405(a).
55. - Id § 1.405(b).
56. l § 1.407.
57. L § 1.412.
58. L § 1.415. The FCC may extend the rulemaking by issuing a second Notice of Pro-
posed Rulemaking before issuing a decision. L § 1.421.
59. See id. § 1.415.
1994]
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lite proponents petitioned for a rulemaking to allocate the domestic
use of the frequency spectrum to LEO satellites.' The FCC finally
adopted its Report and Order finalizing the frequency allocation in late
December 1993.61
C. FCC Licensing Requirements for Satellites
Even after the threshold issues of frequency allocation and as-
signment have been decided, each LEO satellite system must comply
with FCC licensing requirements.62 Private companies must submit
written applications to the FCC requesting permission to construct,63
launch and operate a satellitef' To obtain an operating license, an
applicant must submit information concerning the character and citi-
zenship of the applicant,65 and the financial ability of the applicant to
construct, launch and operate the proposed satellite system.66 The ap-
plicant must also demonstrate the technical feasibility of the proposed
system. 67
The FCC's mandate is to "encourage the provision of new tech-
nologies and services to the public."6" The FCC follows a "public
interest" standard when determining whether an applicant has met the
appropriate satellite licensing criteria.6 9 In making a determination of
whether to grant a license, the FCC must also evaluate the "conven-
ience and necessity" of the proposed new service.70 From the begin-
60. Large LEO Satellite NPRM, supra note 2.
61. Large LEO Satellite R&O, supra note 19.
62. Private satellite activities are permitted under international law. The United States is a
party to the United Nations Outer Space treaty regarding the exploration and use of outer space.
Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer
Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, Jan. 27, 1967, 18 U.S.T. 2410, T.I.A.S.
No. 6347, 610 U.N.T.S. 205. State parties to the treaty are required under Article VI to authorize
and provide continuing supervision of the activities of non-governmental entities in outer space.
Id.
In accordance with this international obligation, the FCC has been authorized to require
licenses for privately-owned radiocommunication satellites. 47 U.S.C. § 301 (1988) ("No person
shall use or operate any apparatus for the transmission of energy or communications... except
... with a license that has been granted under the provisions of this chapter.").
63. 47 U.S.C. § 319(a) (1988). The FCC has ruled that satellites are within the statutory
definition of "station" defined in 47 U.S.C. § 153(k). See Report and Order, 22 F.C.C. 2d 86,
app. C, at 129.
64. 47 U.S.C. §§ 308 and 153(cc)-(ee) (1988).
65. 47 U.S.C. § 308(b)(1988). Under § 310(b), a license may not be granted if more than
one-fifth of the shareholders of the applicant company are foreigners or if the applicant corpora-
tion is controlled by foreigners, or if more than one-fourth of the directors are foreigners.
66. 47 U.S.C. § 308 (1988).
67. Id
68. 47 U.S.C. § 157(a) (1988).
69. 47 U.S.C. § 309(a) (1988).
70. Id
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ning of the commercialization of space technology, the FCC has
maintained that its policy of promoting competition in the private sec-
tor and imposing minimal technical design standards furthers the pub-
lic interest.71
MI. LICENSE DIsTRIUTION BY THE FCC: COMPARATIVE HEARINGS,
NEGOTIATED RULEMAmING, LOTTERIES, PIONEER'S
PREFERENCE, AND COMPETITIVE BIDDING RULES
Until recently, the FCC used two methods to distribute licenses
among mutually exclusive applications: comparative hearings and lot-
teries.72 Responding to the concerns of private companies that the
FCC's existing licensing rules discouraged innovation, in 1991 the
FCC determined that certain applicants requesting spectrum allocation
rule changes and licenses were entitled to a licensing preference or
"pioneer's preference."73 In August 1993, Congress amended the
Communications Act of 1934, giving the FCC the authority to assign
licenses by competitive bidding when mutually exclusive applications
are filed.74 As a result, the FCC has initiated a review of its licensing
rules to consider whether to amend or repeal its pioneer's preference
rules.75
A. Comparative Hearings
Until 1982, the FCC exclusively selected among competing ap-
plicants for a license by holding administrative hearings to evaluate
their proposals under comparative criteria;76 although the FCC may
grant licenses without a hearing, if the FCC determines that "the pub-
lic interest, convenience, or necessity would be served" by the grant.
However, if the FCC does not grant a license, applicants still have the
right to a hearing before their applications are denied. 7 Comparative
71. Meredith & Schroeder, supra note 5, at 114.
72. In the Matter of Review of the Pioneer's Preference Rules, FCC Notice of Proposed
Rule Making, ET Docket 93-266,8 F.C.C.R. 7692, 1 5 (released Oct. 21, 1993; adopted Oct. 21,
1993), available in LEXIS, FEDCOM library, FCC file [hereinafter Review].
73. 47 C.F.R. §§ 1.401-.403, 5.202 (1993). See In the Matter of Establishment of Proce-
dures to Provide a Preference to Applicants Proposing an Allocation for New Services, Report
and Order, GEN Docket No. 90-217, 6 F.C.C.R. 3488 (released May 13, 1991; adopted April 9,
1991) [hereinafter Pioneer's Preference].
74. Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993, Pub. L. 103-66, Title VI, § 6002, 107
Stat. 387, (to be codified at 47 U.S.C. § 3090)(11)). This authority to use competitive bidding
will expire September 30, 1998. Id.
75. Review, supra note 72, 1.
76. In the Matter of Amendment of the Commission's Rules to Establish New Personal
Communications Services, Notice of Proposed Rule Making and Tentative Decision, 7 F.C.C.R.
5676, app. D (released Aug. 14, 1992; adopted July 16, 1992) [hereinafter PCS Rules].
77. 47 U.S.C. § 309(e) (1988).
1994]
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hearings date from 1945, when the Supreme Court in Ashbacker Radio
Corp. v. F.C.C.78 held that the Communications Act requires that all
mutually exclusive license applications are entitled to comparative
consideration.79 Because Congress granted license applicants a right
to a hearing before their applications were denied, to grant a license to
one applicant "without a hearing to both deprives the loser of the op-
portunity which Congress chose to give him."80
Comparative hearings have several major problems as a licensing
process; for one, they tend. to be expensive and time-consuming. 81
Existing licensees have an incentive to use the hearings as a means to
delay competitors' entry into the field.8 In addition, the FCC has had
considerable difficulty in determining comparative criteria.83 Finally,
since certain licenses are transferable, "the ultimate licensee may not
be the party that the [FCC] deemed most worthy."84
B. Negotiated Rulemaking
Under the Negotiated Rulemaking Act of 1990 (NRA)85 and the
Federal Advisory Committee Act86 the FCC has the authority to estab-
lish advisory committees to negotiate regulations defining the techni-
cal rules that will apply to frequency allocations.8 These advisory
committees include representatives of the interested parties that may
be significantly affected by the outcome of proposed rules to allocate
frequency spectrum.88 The stated goal of an advisory committee is to
develop regulations based on a "consensus on the language or sub-
stance of the appropriate rules."8 9
Negotiated rulemaking attempts to encourage negotiations, in a
less adversarial setting than comparative hearings, by developing reg-
ulations "that will facilitate the shared use of the spectrum by the max-
imum number of... providers." 90 Negotiated rulemaking was created
78. 326 U.S. 327 (1945).
79. id.
80. Im. at 333.
81. PCS Rules, supra note 76, app. D.
82. Id. Significantly, the FCC allows interested parties to petition the FCC to deny an
application for a license filed by another party. See 47 U.S.C. § 309(d) (1988).
83. PCS Rules, supra note 76.
84. IM
85. 5 U.S.C. §§ 581-50 (1993).
86. 5 U.S.C. app. § 1 (1993).
87. See FCC Asks for Comments Regarding the Establishment of an Advisory Committee
to Negotiate Proposed Regulations, Public Notice, CC Docket No. 92-166, 7 F.C.C.R. 5241, I
(Released Aug. 7, 1992), [hereinafter Negotiated Rulemaking].
88. Id.
89. m, at 3.
90. Id.
410 [Vol. 10
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to allow "greater public participation than 'Notice-and-Comment
Rulemaking' " and to reduce the "likelihood of litigation after a rule
has been promulgated."'" The FCC concluded that the proposed allo-
cation of frequency spectrum to small and large LEO satellites met the
criteria for negotiated rulemaking.92
While other governmental agencies have experience with negoti-
ated rulemaking, particularly the Environmental Protection Agency
and Occupational Safety and Health Administration,93 the small and
large LEO satellite system rulemaking committees were the FCC's
first experience with negotiated rulemaking.f4 Based on the results of
these two committees, it appears that negotiated rulemaking will play
an important role in the FCC licensing process because of the highly
technical issues involved in licensing these new technologies.
Three major criticisms have been levelled at negotiated rulemak-
ing in general: (1) the process often fails to reach a consensus opin-
ion; (2) the parties may refuse to negotiate in good faith; and (3) the
process may deprive non-mainstream interest groups of an equal op-
portunity to influence policy due to weaker bargaining positions.95
However, the FCC stated that in the event the advisory commit-
tee could not reach a consensus opinion, the majority and minority
reports would be incorporated into the FCC's Notice-and-Comment
Rulemaking. 96 This policy allows private parties a greater influence
91. Marshall J. Breger, Defining Administrative Law, 60 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 268, 276
(1991) (reviewing PETER L. S-RAus, AN INTRODUION TO ADmISTRATrVE JuSTIcE IN THE
UITEo STATEs (1989)). But an advisory committee's report is only a proposed rule; the report
must still receive the FCC's imprimatur through the notice-and-comment rulemaking process.
Peter M. Shane, Symposium: The Newo Public Law: Structure, Relationship, Ideology, or, How
Would We Know A "New Public Law" If We Saw It?, 89 MICH. L. Rev. 837, 844 n.26 (1991).
92. Negotiated Rulemaking, supra note 87, 1 5. Before adopting negotiated rulemaking to
develop new regulations, the FCC must consider whether the following factors have beefi met:
(1) there is a need for a rule; (2) a limited number of interests have been identified that will be
significantly affected by the rule; (3) there is a reasonable likelihood that a committee can be
convened with a balanced representation of persons who can adequately represent those interests
and the parties are willing to negotiate in good faith to reach a consensus on the proposed rules;
(4) there is a reasonable likelihood that a committee can reach a consensus within a fixed period
of time; (5) the negotiated rulemaking will not cause an unreasonable delay in the issue of notice
and the new rules; (6) the agency has adequate resources to commit to the committee; and (7) the
agency commits to using the consensus of the committee as the basis for rules proposed by the
agency. Id. 4 (citing NRA § 3, 5 U.S.C. § 583(a)).
93. See, e.g., Thomas 0. McGarity, Some Thoughts on "Deossifying" the Rulemaking Pro-
cess, 41 DuKE L. J. 1385, 1439 (1992).
94. The FCC created separate advisory committees for the small LEO satellite and the
large LEO satellite proponents. See FCC Begins Negotiated Rulemaking For "Global" Cellular
Systems, 15 SATHLLIT Wr., Jan. 11, 1993, available in LEXIS, NEXIS library, CURRNT file.
95. McGarity, supra note 93, at 1439-40; Melanie J. Rowland, Bargaining for Life: Pro-
tecting Biodiversity Through Mediated Agreements, 22 ENVT. L. 503, 526-27 (1992).
96. Negotiated Rulemaking, supra note 87, 3.
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on the FCC's rulemaking decisions. Since only the proponents have
the necessary technical expertise to evaluate the feasibility of the vari-
ous LEO satellite systems, negotiated rulemaking offers an effective
and fair method for the FCC to become adequately informed about the
technical complexities at the least public expense and in the shortest
time frame. Negotiated rulemaking also gives the parties increased
access to the licensing process. When the number of interested and
potentially affected parties is small enough to be manageable, 97 the
negotiated rulemaking process can equalize representation and partici-
pation by all the parties, regardless of the financial resources and
political influence of each party.
While there is a possibility that the FCC might show intransi-
gence at the proposed changes, in fact the FCC has showed flexibility
and a desire to work with the LEO satellite system applicants in the
first negotiated rulemaking committees. 98 This flexibility reflects the
aggressive position repeatedly taken by the FCC in support of the in-
troduction of LEO satellite services in the United States.99
Negotiated rulemaking has also been criticized as a political tool,
used solely to create the impression of citizen power while, in reality,
it is nothing more than an attempt by the agency to increase the public
acceptance of the government's decision." However, the results
from the FCC's first negotiated rulemaking committees suggest that
this procedure will allow greater participation by private and govern-
mental spectrum users in assisting the FCC in the development of
new rules.' 0 '
The most difficult regulatory issue concerning LEO satellites is
the technical debate over which modulation technology is best suited.
to allow the maximum number of users to share the limited frequency
spectrum."° In other settings, negotiated rulemaking has frequently
failed to marshal a consensus when incompatible groups holding rigid
97. The FCC limited both rulemaking advisory committees to between twelve and twenty-
five participants. Negotiated Rulemaking, supra note 87, 10.
98. For example, the FCC allowed a party to participate on the small LEO satellite
rulemaking committee even though the FCC had denied its license application as untimely. Lit-
tle-LEO Negotiated Rulemaking Committee Adjourns, 12 COMM. DAILY, Sept. 22, 1992, at 4
[hereinafter Committee Adjourns].
99. See, e.g., NVNG R&O, supra note 16 (concurring statement by Commissioner
Barrett).
100. Rowland, supra note 95, at 526. This criticism seems especially relevant to environ-
mental negotiations where the parties may hold strong, uncompromising views, and where the
agency may attempt to legitimize an unpopular decision.
101. See Negotiated Rulemaking, supra note 87, 9a 1-3.
102. See, e.g., id. 6; Committee Adjourns, supra note 98. See also discussion of modula-
tion technologies infra appendix B.
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positions were brought together for negotiations. 113  Similarly, nego-
tiated rulemaking for LEO satellite systems has only enjoyed limited
success, hampered by the apparent unwillingness of some of the par-
ties to compromise on their modulation technology."m On other
issues, the small LEO satellite negotiated rulemaking was relatively
successful in streamlining the rulemaking process. 5 Although, the
large LEO satellite rulemaking ended without a consensus opinion,10 6
the FCC recently issued a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking combining
the majority and minority opinions reached by the advisory
committee.'0 7
C. Lotteries
In 1982, Congress authorized the FCC to award licenses by ran-
dom selection. 08 Lotteries have been described as examples of "pure
procedural justice."" 9 This concept has been defined as "when there
is no independent criterion for the right result: instead there is a cor-
rect or fair procedure such that the outcome is likewise correct or fair,
whatever it is, provided that the procedure has been properly fol-
103. McGarity, supra note 93, at 1439. For any negotiation to be successful, the parties
must be prepared to negotiate in good faith. Some parties may refuse to participate in good faith,
believing that their interests may be better served by more traditional rulemaking, legislation, or
litigation. A necessary party may also refuse to participate as a tactic of delay or obstruction. To
continue negotiated rulemaking under this last circumstance, the agency must convince such a
party that only through participation can the reticent party influence the outcome. See Philip J.
Harter, Negotiating Regulations: A Cure for Malaise, 71 Gao. L.J. 1, 73-74 (1982) (Harter's
influential proposal was the catalyst in negotiated rulemaking techniques).
104. Committee Adjourns, supra note 98.
105. See Report of the Below 1 GHz LEO Negotiated Rulemaking Committee, CC Docket
NO. 92-76 (Sept 16, 1992), cited in Small LEO Satellite R&O, supra note 2, n.11. The small
LEO satellite negotiated rulemaking meetings were held between August and September 1992.
See "Cake's Eaten Up" Laced Charges Little LEO Applicants are Carving Spectrum Into 3
Pieces, 12 COMM. DAILY, Aug. 1992. Committee members included four license applicants
(VITA, Starsys, Orbcomm, and Leosat), and other existing and prospective users of the adjacent
frequency bands, including NASA, the Air Force, Army, Navy, NTIA, and NOAA. Id.
106. Large LEO Satellite NPRM, supra note 2, 9. The large LEO satellite negotiated
rulemaking committee was held between January and April 1993. lId 8. The sixteen members
of the committee were included representatives of pending license applicants and other users of
adjacent frequency bands. Id. "The Committee members included representatives from AMSC,
Ellipsat, Motorola, Constellation, TRW, LQSS, the Commission, the Federal Aviation Adminis-
tration (FAA), the Committee on Radio Frequencies (CORF), the National Aeronautics and
Space Administration (NASA), the Wireless Cable Association International, Inc. (Wireless
Cable), Rockwell International Corporation (Rockwell), Communications Satellite Corporation
(Comsat), the U.S. Army, Aeronautical Radio, Inc. (ARINC), and Celsat, Inc. (Celsat)." Id.
n.20.
107. Large LEO Satellite NPRM, supra note 2.
108. 47 U.S.C. § 309(i) (1988).
109. Compare Gumo CALa.Rasi & Pfnui Boanrrr, TArwoc CHoicEs 41-44 (1978) with
JoHN RAwLs, A THEORy OF JusncE 83-90 (1971).
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lowed."110 Allocation by lot is a form of simple egalitarianism, treat-
ing members within an eligible group in the same way regardless of
their individual differences."' Despite the simple appeal of lotteries,
the FCC has experienced difficulties with random selection as a li-
censing process." 2
The number of speculative license applications rose dramatically
because, although application costs were inexpensive, the licenses
were extremely valuable; and the FCC imposed no limit on the
number of lottery applications filed by a single applicant." 3 As a re-
sult, administrative costs increased as "application mills" provided
completed standard applications at affordable rates." 4 The FCC at-
tempted to reduce. the number of speculative applications by shorten-
ing the filing window, but this just induced the majority of applicants
to file on the first possible day." 5
Allocation by lottery is flawed in that random selection treats all
license applicants as equals although they are not necessarily equally
deserving or situated." 6 This is especially true in licensing LEO sat-
ellite systems, because just a handful of companies have already ex-
pended the time and financial resources to develop the innovative
LEO satellite technology. To award a license in a random selection
would unfairly ignore the differences among applicants seeking a li-
cense for purely speculative reasons and those applicants that actually
developed the technology." 7
D. Pioneer's Preferences
Responding to the concerns of the private sector that the FCC's
licensing rules discouraged innovation, the FCC in 1991 determined
that certain applicants requesting spectrum allocation rule changes
were entitled to a licensing preference or "pioneer's preference."11
110. RAWLs, supra note 109, at 86.
111. CALABRESI & BoaBrrr, supra note 109, at 41-42.
112. See PCS Rules, supra note 76, app. D.
113. See PCS Rules, supra note 76, app. D. "Many lottery applicants had no intention to
build or operate a system using the spectrum, but instead sought only to acquire a license at
nominal cost and then sell it, making a large profit and at the same time delaying the delivery of
services to the public." H.R. REP. No. 111, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. pt. 2 (1993).
114. Id For example, one company filed ten thousand applications for a single lottery, and
sixty percent of all the applications received in the lottery were from only ten companies. Id.
115. Id.
116. See CALA.RaaSs & BoBarrr, supra note 109, at 43.
117. Congress was aware of several instances where innovators of a new technology, hav-
ing invested money and time on research and development, lost their chance to capitalize on their
investments in "a flood of lottery applicants." H.R. Rm'. No. 111, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. pt. 2
(1993).
118. Pioneer's Preference, supra note 73.
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The FCC has declared that the objectives of its pioneer's preference
are to "encourage present and future innovators to submit. proposals;
to decrease regulatory uncertainty for the innovator; and to encourage
investors to provide financial support."'" 9
To obtain a pioneer's preference, the applicant must demonstrate
to the FCC that the applicant's proposal is technologically innovative,
and that the innovation will reasonably lead to the establishment of a
new service or will substantially enhance an existing service. 20 In
making its determination, the FCC relies on detailed technical infor-
mation demonstrating the viability of a proposal, including experimen-
tal data provided by the proponent. 2 ' However, the FCC does not
intend to grant a pioneer's preference that would create a nationwide
monopoly. 122
In adopting pioneer's preferences, the FCC concluded that a li-
censing preference would "ensure that innovators have an opportunity
to participate either in new services that they take the lead in develop-
ing or in existing services to which they wish to apply to technolo-
gies."123 The FCC further concluded that a pioneer's preference is
strongly justified by the public interest in encouraging "the develop-
ment of new services and improving existing services by reducing for
the innovator the risks and delays associated with the [FCC's] alloca-
tion and licensing processes." 24 The FCC agreed with some private
companies who argued that innovators of new services 'are more likely
to invest the considerable time and money necessary to develop inno-
vative technology if the FCC would provide assurances that these
companies would receive a license, if-otherwise qualified.? 5
The FCC was concerned that American consumers might not en-
joy the early benefits of innovative technologies if innovators are dis-
suaded from providing new services by their belief that the FCC's
regulatory process puts an excessive burden on license applicants. 126
Thus, the FCC created pioneer's preferences as an inducement to pres-
119. In the Matter of Establishment of Procedures to Provide a Preference to Applicants
Proposing an Allocation for New Services, Memorandum Opinion and Order, GEN Docket No.
90-217,7 F.C.C.R. 1808, 1 23 (released Feb. 26, 1992; adopted Feb. 13, 1992) [hereinafter New
Services].
120. li 3.
121. Id. 4. Experimental data is not a prerequisite to obtaining a preference but the peti-
tioner is required to "demonstrate feasibility of the new service or technology." Id.
122. See Pioneer's Preference, supra note 73, 54.
123. Id. 11.
124. Id. 11.
125. L TI 6, 18.
126. Ld 18.
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ent proposals for new services in a timely manner. 127 If granted, a
pioneer's preference permits a party to file for a license without com-
parative hearings. 128 In the case of multiple petitioners, the FCC will
grant a preference to each applicant who meets the eligibility stan-
dard.' 29 The FCC rejected proposals to guarantee an exclusive license
for six months to a year. 130 In so deciding not to provide a head start,
the FCC noted that the "key public interest benefit of a preference is
the assurance to the pioneering entity that, if otherwise qualified, it
will receive a license."
131
Each applicant must submit a separate request for a pioneer's
preference when petitioning for a rulemaking on either an allocation
of the spectrum for a new service or an amendment to permit the use
of a new technology.' 32 A pioneer's preference request must show
that the petitioner has developed the technology or brought the tech-
nology to a more advanced or effective stage. 3 3 The request must
contain pertinent information concerning how the service will be im-
plemented, the frequencies to be used, and the area for which the ser-
vice is sought. Each request must also demonstrate the technical
feasibility of the new service and show whether conflicting licensing
rules will apply.' 34 Significantly, the FCC has concluded that the peti-
tioner's financial and technical qualifications are not eligibility
requirements.13 5
Next, the FCC places petitions for pioneer's preference on Public
Notice, and may solicit the comment of recognized experts. 136 If re-
view of the relevant material indicates that a proposal is meritorious,
the FCC will issue a "Tentative Decision" that a conditional prefer-
ence is warranted. 7 The Tentative Decision will be made when a
Notice of Proposed Rulemaking is issued, and the preference will be-
come final when and if the final rules issued in a "report and order"
are similar to the innovator's proposal. 138 Requests for pioneer's pref-
erence will be accepted until the issuance of a notice of proposed
127. Id.
128. 47 CFR § 1.402(d) (1993).
129. Pioneer's Preference, supra note 73, 74.
130. Id l 24-32.
131. Id. 134.
132. Id. 74; 47 CFR § 1.403 (1993).
133. 47 C.F.R. § 1.402 (Supp. 1993).
134. Id
135. Pioneer's Preference, supra note 73, 41.
136. Id. 74; 47 CFR § 1.403 (1993).
137. Pioneer's Preference, supra note 73, 74; 47 CFR § 1.402(d) (1993). This tentative
decision is an extra step in the FCC's rulemaking procedure, applicable to pioneer's preference.
138. 47 CFR § 1.402(d) (1993).
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rulemaking.' 39 Finally, the FCC has decided that a pioneer's prefer-
ence may not be transferred as a separate object of sale once it is
granted. 140
Three companies have petitioned for pioneer's preferences in the
small LEO satellite format;141 five companies petitioned for pioneer's
preference in the large LEO satellite format. 42 In reviewing the peti-
tions for pioneer's preference in both formats, the FCC considered
whether the proposal adds functionality, involves a new use of the
spectrum, changes some technical or operating characteristic, in-
creases spectrum efficiency, boosts the speed or quality of information
transferred, and whether the cost of the service to the public is
reduced. 43
The first and only pioneer's preference for the LEO satellite sys-
tems was granted to "Volunteer in Technical Assistance" for a small
LEO satellite system operating below 1 GHz.'" All other petitions in
both LEO satellite formats were denied because the petitioners failed
to demonstrate that their technology was unique or that their design
surpassed the state of art in satellite communication technology.1 45
One area of debate concerning pioneer's preference has been
whether this policy has reduced the regulatory and licensing burden on
American firms or increased the potential for delay. 146  Since each
company would have applied for a license without the preference pol-
icy, it might be argued that this policy has actually increased the li-
censing process. 4 7 At least one possible reason that a company
would file for a preference and object to other petitions is in order to
gain a time advantage to find investors and to develop its own system
further. Given the benefits that a licensing preference engenders,
139. Pioneer's Preference, supra note 73, 74.
140. Id.
141. See Small LEO Satellite NPRM, supra note 2, n.7.
142. See Large LEO Satellite TD, supra note 1, 1 33.
143. Pioneer's Preference, supra note 73, 49.
144. Small LEO Satellite R&O, supra, note 2, 1. In related rulemaking concerning per-
sonal communication services, the FCC granted 3 pioneers preferences in the 2 GHz band, deny-
ing 47 other petitions, PCS Pioneer's Preference Granted to APC, Cox, and Omnipoint, News,
GEN Docket 90-314 (released Dec. 23, 1993), available in LEXIS, FEDCOM library, FCC file;
and granted one pioneer's preference in the 900 MHz band. Review, supra note 72, 1 18. For a
brief discussion of the proposals of each LEO satellite system applicant, see infra appendix A.
145. Compare Small LEO Satellite R&O, supra note 2 with Large LEO Satellite TD, supra
note 1, 2. The FCC further noted that none of the five proponents in the large LEO satellite
format had fully established the technical feasibility of their systems. Large LEO Satellite TD,
supra note 1, 50.
146. See, e.g., Pioneer' Preference, supra note 73 (separate statements of Commissioner
Ervin S. Duggan and Commissioner Sherrie P. Marshall).
147. Id.
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every company that has the slightest chance of receiving a pioneer's
preference will no doubt attempt to convince the FCC that its proposal
is innovative or is a substantial enhancement of existing technol-
.ogy. 148 Responding to each request may delay the licensing process.
Other criticisms of the pioneer's preference policy include fears
that the licensing process may "politiciz[e] awards that should be im-
partial," and that the FCC will become distracted "with hair-splitting
debates about what constitutes real newness, novelty, and pioneer-
ing."'14 9 Given the FCC's conservative approach towards awarding pi-
oneer's preferences,' 5" the benefits of such a preference should
outweigh its potential disadvantages. Pioneer's preference requests
are decided' when the FCC issues a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking
concerning the allocation of the spectrum. s15  This policy ensures that
any delay added to the licensing process will be minimal. The pio-
neer's preference policy has encouraged innovators to apply for the
allocation of the radio frequency spectrum to LEO satellites at the
early stages of the development process.
The FCC has recently proposed to amend its pioneer's preference
rules, which would limit acceptance of requests to new technologies
and eliminate requests for a preference based upon new uses of ex-
isting technologies.' 52 To accelerate the licensing process, the FCC
may also change its pioneer preference rules to eliminate the Tentative
Decision at the Notice of Proposed Rulemaking stage.153 Decisions
would be made at the Report and Order stage, permitting the FCC "to
consider fully the pioneering efforts and technologies in conjunction
with the proposed service."'" 4 However, after Congress authorized
the FCC to use the competitive bidding process to select licensees
from mutually exclusive applicants, the FCC is currently reviewing
the possibility of repealing its pioneer preference policy altogether. 155
148. ld
149. Id (separate statement of Commissioner Ervin S. Duggan).
150. The FCC has indicated that it will strictly follow its pioneer's preference rules, award-
ing the preference only after the applicant has overcome "a significant burden to persuade the
Commission that its proposal is innovative, has merit and that the applicant is the original devel-
oper or proponent of the innovation at issue." Eric Fishman, Awarding Today's Innovators With
Pioneer's Preferences, N.Y.U., Dec. 31, 1992, at 7.
151. Pioneer's Preference, supra note 73, 61.
152. Review, supra note 72, 17. The rules may also be amended to require that requests
be filed before the FCC initiates a rulemaking proceeding, and to limit the submission of experi-
mental data to selected, relevant material rather than the entire experimental file. Id. 1 15.
153. Id 16.
154. Id.




The FCC now has the authority, to use competitive bidding to
assign licenses if mutually exclusive applications are filed.156 As part
of the president's budget submitted to Congress, President Clinton
proposed competitive bidding as a revenue source andas a method to
improve the FCC's licensing process."5 7 The FCC itself had indicated
that limiting the licensing procedures to comparative hearings and lot-
teries often resulted in arbitrary and inefficient assignments.' 5 8 Since
the 1980s, a number of commentators, including the members of the
FCC, believed that "the government is failing to manage wisely one of
the nations [sic] most valuable national resources" by failing to re-
ceive compensation for assigning the spectrum to private licensees. 5 9
Under a competitive bidding system, "the value of innovation
may be considered in the marketplace and measured by the ability to
raise funds necessary to obtain the desired license(s)." ° Administra-
tive delays in the licensing process should be shorter than in compara-
tive hearings and lotteries.' 6 ' Given the federal government's current
fiscal troubles, competitive bidding offers the least costly process to
select among mutually exclusive applicants and "would give taxpayers
a return for value conferred in a license." 62
The use of competitive bidding to allocate licenses has been criti-
cized as favoring established companies with large financial resources
-over new, "start-up" businesses.' 63 Not only will incumbents have
greater resources to submit higher bids, but the smaller firms may
have difficulty obtaining financing from the capital markets to re-
search and develop innovative technology in the first place, because
the new or smaller firms would be disadvantaged under the competi-
tive bidding system. However, the FCC determined that:
156. Authority to Use Competitive Bidding, § 6002, Omnibus Reconciliation Act of 1993,
(to be codified at 47 U.S.C. § 3096)).
157. H.R. REP. No. 111, 103d Cong.,lst Sess., pt. 2 (1993). President Clinton's proposal
was similar to the position of the Bush and Reagan administrations. Id.
158. l
159. Id. Competitive bidding as an allocative method has already been used by other gov-
ernmental agencies. 43 U.S.C. §§ 1331-1356 (1988) (lease rights to drill for oil and gas in the
outer continental shelf); 30 U.S.C. § 181 (1988) (federal coal leases). Both New Zealand and the-
United Kingdom have used competitive bidding to award licenses. PCS Rules, supra note 76,
app. D.
160. Review, supra note 72, 7.
161. PCS Rules, supra note 76, app. D. Even the most streamlined comparative hearings
average 30 months; the random selection process averages 12 months. ld.
162. Il
163. H.R. REP. No. 111, 103d Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 3 (1993).
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[C]ompetitive bidding is superior or equivalent to lotteries and
comparative hearings in all respects. All methods would ultimately
assign a license to the user who values it most, but competitive
bidding would do so more quickly. It would reduce the FCC's cost
of administering selections, and most importantly would reduce the
real private resources expended in seeking licenses. 64
Despite the FCC's new authority to use competitive bidding in
lieu of comparative hearings or lotteries, the FCC's pioneer preference
policy was not directly affected by the amendments to the Communi-
cations Act. The House Report on the bill authorizing competitive
bidding was expressly neutral toward the FCC's pioneer's preference
policy. 165 Since the FCC itself adopted and implemented its pioneer's
preference policy, the FCC may continue to award pioneer's prefer-
ences as long as doing so does not conflict with its new competitive
bidding mandate.1 66 However, the FCC has concluded that it must re-
examine the public interest basis for its pioneer preference rules, since
an innovator may obtain a license for a new service through competi-
tive bidding without filing for a pioneer's preference.1 67
Both policies were adopted in response to the general dissatisfac-
tion with comparative hearings and lotteries but they address different
public concerns. The pioneer's preference rules were adopted by the
FCC to encourage innovation and to ensure that true innovators were
rewarded for their efforts, which benefits the public in the end by en-
couraging the earliest introduction of new technologies and services.
Competitive bidding was advanced by Congress at least partially in
response to the federal government's own need to reduce spending.
The goals of competitive bidding are to reduce the time burden and
costs on the FCC, and to make private companies pay for their right to
use an important public resource.1 68 Two main questions remain: are
these policies consistent, and do they both serve the public interest?
In the final analysis, both policies should be followed in appro-
priate situations. Competitive bidding does not permit start-up or
smaller businesses to have a reasonable expectation of obtaining a li-
cense even though they develop innovative technologies. On the other
hand, competitive bidding promotes the public interest by requiring
companies to pay for the right to exploit the radio frequency spectrum.
The FCC is currently considering a way to reconcile these two policies
by changing the pioneer's preference rules to charge a fee for such a
164. PCs Rules, supra note 76, app. D.
165. H.R. REP. No. Ill, 103d Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 3 (1993).
166. Id.
167. Review, supra note 72, 7.
168. See supra note 164 and accompanying text.
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preference. 169 Some companies have suggested that "pioneer's prefer-
ence licensees should be required to pay a fee equal to the lowest
winning bid for the appropriate licensing area."' 170
Pioneer's preference licensees should not have to pay for such a
licensing preference because the sole purpose of the policy is to en-
courage innovation. Requiring the innovator to pay for the preference
would take away a major reason for the preference. Since the FCC's
implementation of this policy so far indicates that pioneer's preference
awards will be difficult to obtain, the preference poliqy should be con-
tinued. Especially with the proposed changes to the preference
rules, 171 which should reduce speculative requests and accelerate the
procedure, pioneer's preferences will benefit the public interest in a
way that competitive bidding cannot. In most instances, however,
competitive bidding should be the FCC's licensing method, since few
companies will be able to obtain a pioneer's preference.
IV. CONCLUSION
Within a few years, the first generation of LEO satellite systems
should be providing new global telecommunications. The FCC now
has the authority to auction licenses to the highest bidder or to provide
a pioneer's preference license. Both of these policies are superior to
the comparative hearing and random selection methods previously
used by the FCC to issue licenses. 172 While the issue of pioneer's
preferences has been addressed and resolved in the LEO satellite for-
mat, this policy has continued application in licensing future satellite
technology and in the related technologies associated with personal
communication services. However, the FCC's pioneer's preference
and competitive bidding policies must continue to evolve with the
technology in order to continue to serve the public interest best.
169. d 10.
170. l n.12
171. See supra note 152 and accompanying text.
172. The FCC retains the authority to use either comparative hearings or random selection
methods under appropriate circumstances. See discussions supra parts III.A. & III.C.
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APPENDix A: LEO SATELLITE PROPOSALS 173
A. Small LEO Satellite Proposals
* Volunteers in Technical Assistance (VITA) is a non-profit organi-
zation planning to provide humanitarian assistance to developing
countries. Using a two satellite system, VITA plans to connect about
1,000 ground stations around the world to provide disaster prevention
and response communications. VITA has installed ground systems in
Sierra Leone, Djibouti, Indonesia, Ireland, Pakistan and New Mexico.
VITA's system can incorporate either FDMA or CDMA technology
for transmission. (FDMA and CDMA are two of the competing digital
transmission technologies currently vying to become the industry stan-
dard. See appendix B).
* Orbital Communications Corporation (ORBCOMM) is a subsidi-
ary of Orbital Sciences Corporation based in Fairfax, Virginia.
ORBCOMM has proposed to provide commercial messaging and po-
sition determination using a 36 satellite system. ORBCOMM's most
recent plans as of June 1994 call for the LEO satellites to be placed in
orbit at 775 kIn. ORBCOMM plans to use FDMA modulation tech-
nology to provide communications to and from commercial fixed and
mobile terminals.
* STARSYS is a subsidiary of Collecte Localisation Satellite which
is 51% owned by the French government's space agency. STARSYS
has proposed to provide commercial two-way messaging and position
determination with a 24 small LEO satellite system orbiting at about
1,300 kn. STARSYS plans to use CDMA technology.
B. Large LEO Satellite Proposals
' Motorola Satellite Communications plans to operate "Iridium," a
system of 66 large LEO satellites placed in six orbital planes at 765
km above the earth in order to provide global voice and data services.
(77 satellites were original planned, hence the name based on the
atomic number of Iridium). Iridium is the sole large LEO system
designed to operate on FDMA and TDMA technologies. (See appen-
dix B). Motorola's $3.7 billion dollar project is the only large LEO
system which plans to bypass land-based telephone systems entirely.
At this point, Motorola envisions charging $3,000 for each satellite-
phone with calls costing $3 per minute.
173. The following sources were used to compile summaries of the LEO satellite proposals:
Small LEO R&O, supra note 2; Pioneer's Preference, supra note 73; Large LEO Satellite 7D,
supra note I; Large LEO Satellite NPRM, supra note 2; FCC Awards Pioneer's Preference to




* Loral Qualcomm has proposed "Globalstar," a $1.5 billion project
using 48 large LEO satellites orbiting at 1380 km to provide world-
wide services at an estimated 50 cents per minute. Globalstar will use
CDMA technology.
+ TRW has proposed "Odessey," a 12 satellite system of intermedi-
ate orbiting satellites to provide global services at an estimated 65
cents per minute. TRW plans to place its satellites in three orbital
planes, 4 per plane, at approximately 8,600 km above the earth.
* Constellation Communications has proposed "Aries," a system of
48 satellites orbiting at 845 kin, including 4 satellites in polar orbit, to
provide its global services. Aries will use CDMA technology.
* Ellipsat International has proposed "Ellipso," a 24 satellite system
placed in an intermediate-range elliptical orbit at 1250 km above the
earth. Ellipso will operate on CDMA technology.
* Teledesic Corporation has announced plans for a $9 billion pro-
ject to provide video, telephone and computer services to fixed points,
rather than mobile services with a system of 840 LEO satellites orbit-
ing at 700 kIn. Formed in March 1994 by Microsoft's Bill Gates and
Craig McCaw of McCaw Cellular Communications, Teledesic did not
participate in the negotiated rulemaking or pioneer's preference
proceedings.
APPENDiX B: MODULATION-ACCESS TECHNOLOGIES174
* Time Division Multiple Access (TDMA) is a digital modulation-
access technology which divides a single frequency channel among
multiple users by allocating unique time slots of roughly half a milli-
second to each user. The Telecommunications Industry Association
has adopted TDMA as one of the digital standards in America. More
than 50 cellular telephone carriers in almost 40 countries, including
most of the European Union have also adopted TDMA as their digital
telephone standard.
* Code Division Multiple Access (CDMA) is a form of digital mod-
ulation-access technology which transmits numerous signals within
the same frequency bandwidth, all at the same time. Each signal is
tagged with an unique code which allows the. signals to be distin-
guished by the receiver and avoid mutual interference. CDMA is also
174. The following sources were used to create summaries of the three competing digital
modulation-access technologies: PCS Rules, supra note 76; Telecommunications Survey,
ECONOMIST, Oct. 23, 1994 (insert after page 68). For greater technical explanations of these
modulation technologies, see e.g. RoGER L. FREEMAN, TELECOMMUNICATION TRANSMISSION
HANDBOOK 308-314 (2d ed. 1981) and MARvIN K. SIMON Er AL., I SPREAD SpECmtruM
COMMtuNcAmONs 23 (1985).
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one of the digital standards recently adopted by the Telecommunica-
tions Industry Association.
* Frequency Division Multiple Access (FDMA) is another digital
modulation-access technology which shares a frequency bandwidth
among multiple users by allocating each user a smaller channel within
the main bandwidth.
